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Do markets learn from experience?
Price reaction to stock dividends
in the Turkish market
KUÈ RS, AT AYDOG3 AN and GUÈ LNUR MURADOG3 LU
Faculty of Business Administration, Bilkent University, 06533 Ankara, Turkey
In this paper we provide an empirical analysis of the announcement and implementa-
tion of rights issues and stock dividends in the thinly traded Istanbul Stock
Exchange. The e ciency of the Turkish market with respect to this information set is
tested at di erent time horizons characterized by di erent development levels of the
market. Evidence is detected of di erent price reactions for the di erent development
phases of the market as well as for the board meeting and actual implementation
information. As the market matures, neither the board meeting nor the actual
implementation of stock dividends Ð rights o erings cause signi® cant price reactions.
Besides the traditional event study methodology, non-parametric tests such as sign
and rank tests are also employed but are found to be unsuitable for this particular
case.
I . INTRODUCTION
Stock price reactions to announcements of splits and stock
dividends have been investigated by many researchers. In
earlier studies, e.g. Fama et al. (1969), the prime concern was
to examine the speed of, and the process by which prices
adjusted to the information content of a stock split. Since
signi® cant positive announcement e ects are documented
for many mature stock markets, recent studies test the
empirical validity of several hypotheses explaining this phe-
nomenon. Marsh (1979), for example, tested the price pres-
sure hypothesis that assumes downward sloping demand
curves leading to depressed prices, against the substitution
hypothesis (Scholes, 1972), which assumes high demand
elasticity due to the existence of risky assets as close substi-
tutes and unchanged prices. He used rights o erings as the
information set and concluded that the UK market is highly
liquid. Similarly, Baker and Gallager (1980) argue that splits
enhance the liquidity of ® rms’ shares. McNichols and
Dravid (1989) provide evidence for signalling hypothesis
(Fama et al., 1969) by correlating price changes by the split
factor. Woolridge and Chambers (1983) maintain the trad-
ing range hypothesis by discussing that the management
uses its private information to set the split factor so that the
stock price is brought back to a popular trading range.
Lamoureux and Poon (1987) claim that price increases after
splits are due to the changing mix of investors from institu-
tional to individual, which increases the number of stock-
holders and the trading volume. Asquith et al. (1989) claim
that the positive announcement e ects are due to the expec-
tations that the earnings increases prior to the split are
permanent, as opposed to the signalling hypothesis, which is
based on anticipation of future cash ¯ ows from dividends.
In conducting tests of e ciency for emerging markets by
using split announcements, concerns other than the analysis
of information content gain importance. One major concern
is to distinguish between the informational impact of the
p̀ure event’, i.e. the split announcement and other accom-
panying information (Grinblatt et al., 1984; Liljeblom,
1989). Another concern is to specify the event date. The
event date can be the date of the board meeting when the
split decision is made or the press release of this decision
(Liljeblom, 1989), or the date when the split is exercised at
the stock exchange. The third and supposedly the most
important concern in an emerging market is learning (Tim-
merman, 1993) and the existence of a trend towards market
e ciency as the market grows in size and transaction vol-
ume (Dawson, 1984). The Turkish market is known to
adjust slowly to stock dividend and rights o erings informa-
tion during the ® rst three years of its operations (Çadõ rcõ ,































1 During the period under investigation, when new shares were sold at a price above the par value, the premium was subject to corporate
tax.
2 Banks in Turkey are permitted to declare stock dividends only if they make a rights issue by the same amount.
1990). So far the e ciency of the market with respect to this
information set has not been tested at di erent time hor-
izons characterized by di erent development levels of the
market.
In this paper we provide an empirical analysis of the
announcement and implementation of rights issues and
stock dividends in the thinly traded Istanbul Stock
Exchange (ISE). In order to investigate the impact of the
market’s level of development and its implications on e -
ciency, we divide the sample period into two sub-periods.
The ® rst sub-period is characterized by low trading volume,
ambiguous rules concerning the items to be disclosed as well
as their timing, and scarce information on fundamentals.
We argue that stock dividends Ð rights o erings are regarded
as indicators of fundamentals like pro® tability and a ® xed
asset base, and hence they are received favourably by the
market. The second sub-period, on the other hand, displays
a higher level of development in terms of accounting
standards and disclosure of ® rm speci® c information. As
a result, stock dividends Ð rights o erings are taken as what
they actually are rather than indicators on fundamentals.
We expect cumulative abnormal returns to be lower in the
second sub-period. In addition to the traditional t-tests, we
also experimented with non-parametric tests advocated for
thinly traded markets. However, we conclude that, due to
the di culties in the speci® cation of the event date, these
tests are not appropriate for this study.
Turkey is a representative case for this type of an event
study in emerging markets due to her experience in the
establishment and development of a stock market, and
speci® c features of the market in terms of a legal framework.
The ® nancial markets in Turkey were highly ine cient and
strictly regulated until 1980. Attempts for the liberalization
of the country, in general and ® nancial markets, in particu-
lar, started at the beginning of 1980s with the introduction
of a liberalization package encouraged by the World Bank
and IMF. The establishment of the legal framework and
regulatory agencies for the stock market was completed in
1982, but it took four more years until the Istanbul Stock
Exchange, the only stock exchange in Turkey, became
operational , in 1986. The exchange has shown remarkable
growth both in terms of trading volume and number of
listed companies. By the beginning of 1994 the daily volume
of trade was 76.5 million US$ and more than 150 companies
were listed. Today, market capitalization, trading volume,
and number of companies listed in ISE are above those
in Eastern European exchanges and other European ex-
changes such as Greece, Portugal and Finland.
One distinct characteristic of the Turkish stock market is
the frequency and volume of stock dividends and rights
o erings. Stock dividends are declared from retained earn-
ings, or a revaluation fund, an equity account created as
a result of in¯ ation adjustment of ® xed assets. The in¯ ation
rate in Turkey ¯ uctuated between 30% to 70% during the
1980s and early 1990s. Since 1983, corporations are per-
mitted to adjust their ® nancial statements for in¯ ation by
using a standard procedure called revaluation . Revaluation,
as exercised in Turkey, requires the increase of the book
value of plant assets by a constant ratio, usually comparable
to the in¯ ation rate, announced by the Ministry of Finance.
When the value of plant assets and related depreciation
expenses are adjusted for in¯ ation, an account called the
revaluation fund is credited and this account is listed under
the equity. Corporations are also permitted to transfer the
revaluation fund to paid-in-capital by declaring stock divi-
dends. Since corporations are limited to issue debt up to
600% of paid-in-capital , under the high in¯ ation rates
experienced in Turkey most corporations convert the re-
valuation fund and retained earnings to paid-in-capital by
declaring stock dividends so that they can maintain consis-
tent debt to paid-in-capital ratios. Therefore, from an ac-
counting perspective, the aforementioned transaction is
a stock dividend, similar to the North American practice.
However, the percentage dividend is not limited to 25%. In
fact, the range of stock dividend percentages in our sample
is 6% Ð 500%, with 80.4% of all stock dividends being above
25%. Hence, investors perceive stock dividends as splits.
In addition to stock dividends, many corporations in-
crease their paid-in-capital by issuing new shares at par
value (TL 1000) through a rights o ering.1 In our sample,
the average market price per share on the day rights were
issued was 12 277 TL, the lowest and highest prices being
600 TL and 155 000 TL respectively. Rights o erings are
usually accompanied by simultaneously declared and paid
cash dividends. Cash dividends, in most cases, are su cient
to pay the value of the new share, i.e. 1000 TL par value.
Therefore, the investor does not usually make any out-of-
pocket payment, and hence regards a rights issue as no
di erent than a stock split.2
Typically, rights o erings, cash dividends and stock divi-
dends are declared at the same time. Investors watch out for
the total s̀plit factor’, which takes rights o erings and stock
dividends into consideration. Therefore, in the Turkish
stock market, rights o erings and stock dividends are
referred to as stock splits.
This study is designed to consider the emerging market
characteristics of the Istanbul Stock Exchange. Announce-
ment dates were collected by a request directed to all the
companies traded at the ISE. In conducting the event
study, abnormal returns around the board decision and its































implementation were calculated for several event windows,
and inferences concerning abnormal returns were obtained
by using both parametric t-tests and non-parametric
rank and sign tests. The trend towards market e ciency,
as the market matures, is examined by applying the above
mentioned methodology to the two periods which are
identi® ed according to the volume of trade and changes
in public announcement procedures. Accordingly, the
paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
the data and methodology. Findings are presented in
Section III. Summary and conclusions are reported in
Section IV.
II . DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The event study methodology that we employ in this study
requires the speci® cation of an unambiguous event date for
the stock dividend and rights o ering decision. Ideally this
event date should be the day on which the decision is ® rst
announced to the public. However, such o cial public an-
nouncements by companies were seldom made during the
period under investigation for reasons ranging from lack of
regulation to public indi erence to the importance of the
issue. So we had to use the date on which the stock dividend
decision was reached in an annual meeting or a board
meeting. In Turkey, companies that utilize a r̀egistered
capital’ framework can issue stock dividends and rights
o erings with the decision of a board of directors. Others
need a mandate from the shareholders in an annual meeting.
Prior to 1991, ® rms whose stocks are traded at the ISE did
not have to inform the exchange immediately after their
decisions. Stock dividends and rights o erings are an-
nounced in the ISE Weekly Bulletins since that date; but the
announcement may come as late as one full week after the
actual decision is obtained. In the announcement, informa-
tion on the actual date and percentage of stock dividends is
reported.
As our investigation period starts from 1988, we decided
to obtain the rights o erings Ð stock dividend announcement
information from the companies themselves. In the letter we
have mailed to company CEOs, we inquired about (i) the
date of the annual meeting or board meeting in which
a stock dividend Ð rights o ering decision was taken, since
1988, and (ii) the date and means by which the information
on stock dividend Ð rights issues was publicly announced.
The letter was mailed to 125 companies whose names
and addresses were listed in ISE (1993). We received 49
responses. Of these, 12 were eliminated for improper re-
sponses due to a misunderstanding of our questions. Most
companies had more than one stock dividend Ð rights o er-
ing during the period under examination. A total of 109
events between 1988 and 1993 are analysed. Of these, 35
events took place in the 1988 Ð 90 period, and 74 events
between 1991 and 1993. Daily closing prices of the stocks
are obtained from the Capital Market Board. They are
adjusted for splits and cash dividends.
The abnormal return on stock i on day t, ARit, is de® ned
as the di erence between daily return, R it, and the return on
the market, Mt : ARit = R it - Mt. The return on day t is the
percentage change in prices between two successive days:
Rit = (Pit - Pi, t ± 1 ) /Pi, t ± 1 where P it and P i, t ± 1 represent ad-
justed closing prices on days t and t - 1. The market return
is de® ned in a similar fashion as the percentage change in
the levels of ISE Composite Index in two successive days.









For n securities, the average cumulative abnormal returns
over an event window extending from t = t to t = T ;












where s (ACART ) = s (ART ) (T + 1)1 /2 and s (ART ) is the
variance over the event window.
Measuring abnormal returns by using the market as
a benchmark does not take risk di erences across stocks
into account. However, employing risk adjustment via the
market model reduces statistical e ciency due to data
limitations (Marsh, 1979). It is also known that, in some
situations, methods that do not adjust for risk perform no
worse than the market model (Brown and Warner, 1980).
Event studies in other smaller markets such as Sweden
(Liljblom, 1989) and Finland (Martikainen et al., 1993) as
well as mature markets (e.g. Asquith et al., 1989) report that
results based on risk adjusted returns are similar to those
with market adjusted returns.
We also computed abnormal returns, ARt, by subtracting
the average return on the stock over a completely neutral
period from the stock return on day t. The neutral period is
taken as the 60 day period from t = + 31 to t = + 90, where
t = 0 is the actual implementation of the stock dividend and
rights o ering. Results were similar to those reported in the
paper, hence they are not presented here.
Although the stock dividend Ð rights o ering decision be-
comes o cial at the board or annual meeting, we know that
the information can leak before the meeting in some cases.
This is especially true for larger ® rms that are partially
owned by the government. Alternatively, due to a closely
held ownership structure, board decisions of some com-
panies are not made public until a few days after the meet-
ing. For those reasons we chose to examine the cumulative































3 We actually employed the rank test and the sign test for an event window of 5 days, from t = 0 to t = 4. Findings (not reported) did not
indicate the presence of abnormal returns.
4 We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this issue to our attention.
Table 1. Main indicators of ISE
Trading Average daily Market
volume volume capitalization Number of listed
Year (in mil. US$) (in mil. US$) (in mil. US$) companies
1988 83.0 0.3 1141.1 79
1989 751.6 2.9 6726.1 76
1990 5226.1 21.0 18 852.6 110
1991 8314.4 33.7 15 533.2 134
1992 8378.2 33.4 9902.5 145
1993 21 278.1 86.5 37 748.5 160
Source: Capital Markets Board (1994), ISE (1994).
abnormal returns around the event date rather than a small
event window immediately after the event date. Hence, we
considered an event window that starts on day t = - 30 and
ends on t = 30 and the parametric t-tests summarized above
are carried out for this event window. This choice rules out
the use of some non-parametric tests such as the rank test
(Corrado, 1989) and sign test (Cowan, 1992) that are parti-
cularly useful for detecting abnormal returns on a single day
or a small event window when the sample size is small.3
In an emerging market, information on fundamentals
such as earnings and dividends is neither reliable nor avail-
able to all traders. This is especially true in the initial phase
when the market as an institution is in development. At this
stage, stock dividends Ð rights o erings may well indicate
fundamentals. In the Turkish market, stock dividends are
declared from retained earnings and revaluation of ® xed
assets. Rights o erings, on the other hand, are new issues
that are usually paid for through simultaneously declared
cash dividends. Thus, pro® table companies with a high ® xed
asset base are expected to declare stock dividends more
often and at higher rates, because higher pro® ts would be
accompanied by higher retained earnings, and a large ® xed
asset base would cause the revaluation fund to be higher.
Conversely, higher and more frequent stock dividends Ð
rights o erings could be taken as an indicator of high
earnings and a large asset base. However, as the market
develops, certain rules and traditions start to take root. For
example, procedures for announcing earnings and dividends
are clari® ed and they tend to become uniform across com-
panies. Accounting standards are re® ned and ® nancial
statements are routinely audited. New legislation and regu-
lation for the market are enacted. Hence, fundamentals are
now less ambiguous to the traders. Instead of relying on
indicators of fundamentals, they can observe them directly
from more reliable and consistent sources such as audited
® nancial statements and interim reports. As a result, an-
nouncement e ects of stock dividends/rights o erings as an
indicator of fundamentals are mitigated. In other words, the
market l̀earns’ to react to direct information as opposed to
ambiguous indicators.
In order to examine the learning e ect in the emerging
Turkish stock market, we decided to divide our sample
period into two subperiods. The ® rst subperiod covers 1988
through 1990, and the second covers the remaining part,
between 1991 Ð 1993. In Table 1, we list the trading volume,
number of listed companies and market capitalization in all
the years between 1988 and 1993. It is clear that the market
has matured over the years in terms of depth and breadth.
Volume ® gures indicate that 1990 is the critical year for
dividing the sample.
We repeated our analysis with the same sample by utiliz-
ing the actual date of the stock dividend Ð rights o ering
as the event date. Cumulative abnormal returns around
the actual split are compared with those around the
board/annual meeting decision. We expect average cumu-
lative abnormal returns to decline in the second subperiod
for both event dates as a result of the learning e ect. Second,
ACARs should be higher around board/annual meeting
dates than those around the actual split dates especially in
the second subperiod. If there is any positive e ect of the
stock dividend Ð rights o ering decision, the market would
capitalize it around the board meeting date.
The reaction of stock prices to the announcement of stock
dividends/rights o erings might depend on the ownership
structure of the company.4 In a closely held company, where
shares of stock are not traded very actively, we can expect
that information can be made public a few days after the
meeting, whereas in a widely held, larger company such
information might leak before the èvent date’. On the other
hand, it might also be argued that after the actual imple-
mentation of the board decision, trading volume will in-
crease due to the more a ordable price range. As the supply































Fig. 1. ACARs around board meeting
of shares is more limited for closely held ® rms, higher
demand will cause appreciation of share values. The impact
of demand increase resulting from this changing investor
mix is not going to be observed for widely held companies.
In order to test di erences between closely versus widely
held companies, we regrouped our sample based on a com-
posite measure for ownership structure. Most companies
traded in ISE are family owned, closely held companies. The
® rst measure we consider for ownership structure is the
percentage of shares held by outsiders. However, òutsiders’
in some companies never trade their shares, hence the
liquidity of those shares does not depend on the percentage
of outside equity. Instead, turnover ratio Ð de® ned as the
ratio of trading volume to total market value Ð is a com-
monly used proxy for liquidity in the Turkish market. We
divided our sample into two, using cluster analysis that
employs the percentage of outside equity and turnover ratio
as the two variables. Group I consists of 16 widely held
companies (high outside equity, high turnover), and 21
closely held (low outside equity, low turnover) companies
constitute the second group. We repeated the analysis for
these two groups at both event dates.
II I . FINDINGS
We computed the average cumulative abnormal returns for
an event window that extends from t = - 30 to t = 30 for
events over the whole sample period as well as the two
subperiods. The event date is taken as the day of the board
or annual meeting. The results are summarized in Fig. 1 and
Table 2. For all the events between 1988 Ð 93, ACARs start
to pick up around t = - 10 and reach 6% on day t = 1. This
® gure is statistically signi® cant. The same trend, in a stron-
ger version, is seen in the ® rst subperiod. Here, the ACAR
on t = 1 is 9.5%, and goes up further to 13.5% on t = 18.
Both are signi® cantly di erent from zero. The second sub-
period, however, displays a di erent outcome. The ACAR
on t = 1 is only 4.5% and it lacks statistical signi® cance.
Hence, it will not be wrong to argue that the signi® cant
ACAR found for the entire sample is due to the abnormal
performance in the ® rst subperiod that covers the years 1988
through 1990.
When the analysis is repeated with the actual split as the
event date, average cumulative returns are found to be lower
as expected. The bottom panel of Table 2 and Fig. 2 show
the results of this analysis. ACARs in the ® rst subperiod
approach 6% around the event date, but they sharply de-
cline to around zero immediately afterwards. In the second
subperiod, no departure from zero is observed in ACARs
around the event date, however they pick up after t = 10,
and approach 8% by t = 30.
The analysis of price reactions for widely held versus
closely held companies reveals some interesting results. As
can be seen from Table 3, the two groups do not exhibit
markedly di erent ACARs around the board meeting deci-
sion. The behaviour of ACARs around the actual implemen-
tation is considerably di erent. For widely held companies,
we observe negative cumulative abnormal returns that are
not statistically signi® cant. However ACARs for closely































Table 2. Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACARs)
Period ACAR( - 10) ACAR(0) ACAR(10) - ACAR(30)
1988 Ð 93 2.69% 5.09%* 4.94%* 3.55%
(1.49) (2.39) (2.05) (1.21)
Board meeting 1988 Ð 90 3.60% 8.36%* 10.75%** 12.04%*
(1.14) (2.26) (2.75) (2.35)
1991 Ð 93 2.33% 3.57% 2.16% - 0.64%
(1.07) (1.37) (0.74) ( - 0.18)
1988 Ð 93 - 1.95% 1.68% 2.82% 6.43%
( - 1.14) (0.71) (0.93) (1.79)
Actual 1988 Ð 90 - 0.24% 4.69% 0.32% 1.76%
( - 0.07) (1.06) (0.05) (0.26)
1991 Ð 93 - 2.62% 0.50% 3.81% 8.29%
( - 1.31) (0.18) (1.06) (1.95)
Numbers in parentheses represent t statistics
* and ** indicate signi® cance at a = 0.05 and a = 0.01 respectively.
Fig. 2. ACARs around actual implementation
held companies start to pick up 9 days before actual imple-
mentation and reach 5% on the event day, 7% after 10 days
and 13% 30 days after the event day. The ® gures become
statistically signi® cant after day 10.
The ® rst subperiod (1988 Ð 90), which is characterized by
low trading volume, fewer listed companies and low capital-
ization, represents the early childhood in the life of the
Turkish stock market. During this period, stock dividends
and rights o erings were possibly taken for more than what
they actually are. During this initial phase of development
the information on stock dividends Ð rights o erings was
important in the sense that other information sources on
fundamentals such as ® nancial statements and interim re-
ports were not standardized in terms of accounting practices
and timing of disclosure. With the entrance of more sophis-
ticated traders, enhancement in information ¯ ow, and new
regulation, it would not be wrong to claim that the market
has matured. In this second sub-period, stock dividends Ð
rights o erings were no longer the most important piece of
information. In the presence of uniform accounting practi-
ces and disclosure requirements more reliable ® rm speci® c
information became available.































Table 3. Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACARs) by ownership structure 1988 Ð 1993
Group ACAR( - 10) ACAR(0) ACAR(10) ACAR(30)
Board meeting I 3.64% 5.97% 6.62% 3.01%
(1.16) (1.60) (1.53) (0.57)
II 2.44% 5.04% 4.18% 4.19%
(1.06) (1.84) (1.37) (1.15)
Actual I - 4.61% - 5.12% - 5.34% - 5.34%
( - 1.67) ( - 1.16) ( - 0.88) ( - 0.79)
II - 0.59% 5.15% 6.99%* 12.47%**
( - 0.27) (1.88) (2.01) (2.98)
Group I and Group II represent widely and closely held ® rms, respectively. Numbers in parentheses
represent t statistics.
* and ** indicate signi® cance at a = 0.05 and a = 0.01 respectively.
Table 4. Correlation coe¦ cients
Event date Period Variable ACAR(0) ACAR(10) ACAR(30)
1988 Ð 93 Sd. Div. 0.1106 0.2082* 0.1327
(0.27) (0.04) (0.18)
SD + RO 0.0820 0.1818 0.1339
(0.41) (0.07) (0.18)
Board meeting 1988 Ð 90 Sd. Div. 0.2980 0.3411 0.1918
(0.10) (0.06) (0.30)
SD + RO 0.1859 0.3101 0.1500
(0.31) (0.08) (0.42)
1991 Ð 93 Sd. Div. - 0.0470 0.0688 0.0368
(0.70) (0.57) (0.76)
SD + RO - 0.0139 0.0478 0.0791
(0.91) (0.69) (0.52)
1988 Ð 93 Sd. Div. - 0.0934 - 0.0485 - 0.1809
(0.35) (0.63) (0.07)
SD + RO - 0.0279 - 0.1406 - 0.2515**
(0.78) (0.16) (0.01)
Actual 1988 Ð 90 Sd. Div. 0.1267 0.0280 - 0.0233
(0.51) (0.88) (0.90)
SD + RO 0.1021 - 0.1648 - 0.1790
(0.59) (0.38) (0.34)
1991 Ð 93 Sd. Div. - 0.2527* - 0.0937 - 0.2705*
(0.03) (0.43) (0.02)
SD + RO - 0.1354 - 0.1122 -0-.2978**
(0.25) (0.35) (0.01)
The numbers in parentheses represent two-tailed signi® cance level of the correlation coe cients.
* and ** indicate signi® cance at a = 0.05 and a = 0.01 respectively.
Signi® cant abnormal returns in the ® rst sub-period points
to a lack of market e ciency. It could be argued that slow
building up of ACARs could be due to di erent patterns of
information release by the companies. Firms with relatively
wider ownership might leak the information before the
event date (i.e. board or annual meeting), whereas informa-
tion from closely held companies may not become
public until several days after the event date. Since ACARs
are averages across companies, an e cient market could
also portray a similar picture provided that stock
dividends Ð rights o erings have a favourable impact.
However, we see from Table 3 that ownership structure does
not a ect the pattern of ACARs around the board meeting
date. Hence, the above argument for e ciency is not
supported. We do not observe the e ect of ownership struc-
ture on information release but instead a signi® cant e ect
of changing the investor mix (Lamoreaux and Poon, 1987)
on the demand side by attracting the small investor after
the implementation of the stock dividend Ð rights o ering
decision.































During the second subperiod, as more sophisticated
investors, both individual and institutional, enter the
market, the average investor becomes more rational.
Another consequence of such new entrants to the market
is increased trading volume, which in turn attracts
more newcomers. The removal of controls on capital move-
ments in August 1989 resulted in the entry of foreign inves-
tors to the Turkish market. This has also contributed to the
greater sophistication in the investor mix and hence to
market e ciency.
If the market regarded stock dividends Ð rights o erings as
indicators about fundamentals, or simply regarded them
irrationally as valuable for some reason, then a company
can increase the value of its stock by keeping its percentage
rate stock dividends Ð rights o erings as high as possible.
Hence, we would expect the stock dividends Ð rights o erings
percentage to be positively correlated with average cumu-
lative abnormal returns. To that end we computed correla-
tion coe cients between ACARs and the percentage stock
dividend Ð rights o ering rates for the entire sample period,
as well as the two subperiods. As before, we considered both
the board meeting and the actual split as the event date. The
correlations are reported in Table 4. Coe cients for the
board meeting data are mostly positive. In the ® rst sub-
period, all correlations are greater than zero, with some
coe cients being statistically signi® cant. The second sub-
period, however, has some negative numbers and all are
very small in magnitude. Correlation coe cients turn out to
be negative for the events de® ned by the actual implementa-
tion date.
The ® gures in Table 4 con® rm our earlier ® ndings. The
market was favourable to stock dividends and rights o er-
ings in the earlier sub-period. However, a favourable re-
sponse disappears and even becomes unfavourable after
actual implementation. This points out the possibility of the
presence of an illusion on stock dividends Ð rights o erings.
The illusion disappears when some traders sell o their
holdings after the actual implementation. Hence, they no
longer display a positive response to stock dividends Ð rights
o ering information, as evidenced by lack of correlation in
the second subperiod.
IV . CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether the an-
nouncement or the implementation of stock dividends
and rights o erings convey new information in a thinly
traded market where fundamentals are neither reliable nor
available to all traders. The analysis is conducted by con-
trolling for di erent institutional phases of the market and
by using the traditional event study methodology. Non-
parametric tests such as rank and sign tests are also
employed and are found to be unsuitable for this particular
case.
The analysis is based on a mail survey inquiring into the
date of the board or annual meeting in which a stock
dividend Ð rights o ering decision was made. Price reactions
to a total of 109 events, of which 35 took place during the
initial phase of the market, were analysed for both board
decisions and actual implementation of the stock divi-
dend Ð rights o ering decisions. We also examined whether
price reactions were di erent for ® rms grouped according to
ownership structure Ð closely versus widely held companies.
Using traditional event study methodology, evidence is
detected of di erent price reactions for the di erent develop-
ment phases of the market as well as for the board meeting
and actual implementation information. Signi® cant positive
price reactions are observed in the initial phase of the
market for board decision disclosures with abnormal re-
turns up to 13.5% on day 18. As the market matures in the
second phase neither the board meeting nor the actual
implementation of stock dividends Ð rights o erings cause
signi® cant price reactions. This trend should be interpreted
as a sign of market e ciency as the market matures, rather
than of di erent patterns of information release, for no
di erences between closely versus widely held companies
are observed in terms of abnormal returns around the board
meeting dates.
Since price reactions were positive for the initial phase, we
tested the correlations between the magnitude of price reac-
tions and stock dividends Ð rights o ering percentages for
both the board decision and actual implementation date. As
expected, the correlations are signi® cant for the initial phase
of the market and for the board meeting decision for a ten
day event window. Both the length of the event window for
positive price reactions and their realization during the
development phase of the market suggest that price reac-
tions are due to the lack of timely information about the
fundamentals of the companies during the initial phase of
the market. In this period, stock dividend Ð rights o ering
decisions contained information either as indicators of
future pro® tability or that previously realized earnings are
permanent. Similar to Lamoureux and Poon (1987), but in
a di erent context, we would also argue that the shift to
e ciency is due to the changing mix of investors. In an
emerging market setting the changing mix of investors from
institutional to individual investors is not due to the chang-
ing trading range but to the cultivating awareness about the
market.
Finally, we should mention that the non-parametric tests
such as the rank test and the sign test suggested for thinly
traded markets were not superior to the traditional event
study methodology in this case. The rank test is known
to be sensitive to the length of event window (Cowan,
1992). In our case, contrary to Corrado’s (1989) one
day event window, the event window is signi® cant up to 18
days. The sign test is superior to the rank test in the case
of extreme abnormal returns and this was not the case for
our sample.
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